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National Role Conception (NRC) is a fresh perspective in foreign policy analysis in Nigeria. It is 
however, not as new in western scholarship. Beginning with Holsti in 1970, and further explored 
by Walker in 1978, Wish in 1980, and Krotz in 2001, NRC has become an attractive prism by 
which the foreign and defence policies of nations are examined. Nations are viewed to be driven 
in international politics by roles they have domestically identified, which they wish to perform 
with the view to securing and furthering their national interest. National Role Conceptions 
(NRCs), the art of articulation by policymakers of the national roles for the external context, 
however, constitute the incubation stage of external policymaking, which involve a lot of 
calculations, strategizing, and rigorous analysis of cost implications of external roles to 
undertake. This paper examines the role conceptions of Nigeria since independence, arguing that 
the basic ingredients for conceiving strategic roles towards the realization of core national 
interest seemed lacking. It adopts the National Role Theory, and interrogates the policymaking 
process to determine the clarity and strategic importance of national or international roles. While 
the paper scooped data from oral interviews from the relevant research population and secondary 
sources; it concludes that Nigeria’s roles in the continent and world are motivated more by 
visibility and relevance, and not so much of a strategy for national development, which is the 
basic goal of foreign policy.   
 
Keywords/Phrases: National Role Conceptions, National Roles, National Interest, Foreign   





Nigeria’s roles in Africa and the world have in more recent times come under criticism for 
lacking basic strategy that characterizes most ambitious foreign policies whose principal goal is 
to secure and further national interest. From independence, Nigeria has set out with an ambitious 
foreign policy with the long-range aspiration to become a world power, after establishing its 
regional and continental relevance. The founding fathers and political leadership had at various 
times justified the natural selection of Nigeria as the powerhouse of African politics by a number 
of favourable factors. These included a huge black population, a rich socio-cultural and historical 
diversity, abundant economic fortunes, the power of oil, and a strong military (Aluko, 1981; 
Shaw, 1983). Indeed, the founding fathers had, with these forces of nature behind the nation, 
argued that it was a “manifest destiny” for Nigeria to take the lead and assume the credible voice 
of the continent (Azikiwe, 1961), and that it would not concede this position to any other nation 
for any reason whatsoever (Balewa, 1964). Consequently, at independence, the Nigerian 
leadership had set the tone for a role-driven foreign policy, and had articulated what would be 
the roles Nigeria would assume in the world.  
 
The problem however, was that the roles identified were relevant only for the times, and there 
would be need for successive leaders to identify strategies or instruments of realization. Nigeria 
was to fight apartheid, contend with neo-colonialism, unite Africans against racism, engender 
liberation in countries contending with comprador elements stifling development, and use its 
military might to keep the peace in the continent. But because the international system is a 
dynamic one, global developments and challenges would change, just as national roles too are 
expected to change in content and strategy. However, subsequent political leaders hung on to the 
old roles for the preceding years, thus making the national roles conceived and assumed static 
and antiquated. The major problem was probably the fact that the leaderships pursued these old 
role conceptions, without reflecting on the challenges of Nigeria, with the view to refocusing the 
foreign policy and re-conceiving international roles that would more likely enhance national 
development. This was because the country continued to slip in development index while still 
offering enormous helps and assistance to the international community in areas such as power 
supply, conflict mediation, resolution and peacekeeping, grants, giving of loans and debt 
cancellation, and even the hosting of international festivals and events that bear little or no 
advantage for national development. 
 
This paper examines the politics of external role conceptions of Nigeria since independence. It 
establishes the fact that while there have been role conceptions by national leadership 
(sometimes vague, sometimes clear, and at times recycled old conceptions), most of them are 
simply over-magnanimous towards the African and global contexts, while they make little or no 
impact on national interest. Against this background, it interrogates Nigeria’s real intentions in 
the world: either to only become visible and be considered relevant as well as recognized as a 
“giant” as it appeared to have been; or to gain considerable leverage and mileage in global 
politics for the purpose of advancing core and other objectives of national development and 
citizens’ prosperity.   
 
Conceptual Clarifications 
For the purpose of understanding the salient issues in this paper, and to have a logical build-up o 
the central arguments, an analysis of the major themes and concepts would be done. These 
concepts include national interest, national roles, NRCs, foreign policy, and strategic policy. 
1. National Interest 
National interest is a generally controversial concept in foreign policy analysis. Scholars do not 
agree on the fact that national interest has a universally accepted definition, and contend with the 
view of whether there is anything that can be called “national” in view of the multitude of 
prevailing personal, class, group, sectional, and public interests in a state. This is because there is 
no definitive measure or a common plank for the streamlining of all these conflicting interests to 
a “nation-al” interest. Hence, some view national interests as the interests of the political or 
ruling class because they may have been constitutionally or traditionally empowered by their 
leadership position to decide for the rest having been given the general will by the people 
through popular or dubious election (Rosati, 2006), or by forceful submission in the case of 
military dictatorship. This is why when a state has taken a particular position on a certain issue, 
there may not be a public domestic backing of it. National interest may thus be ambiguous and 
create the smokescreen for the justification of parochial individual, class or group interests by 
those in government. Henderson (2005) regards national interest as the collective aspiration of a 
state on a world-wide scale. This denotes the official declaration that a nation’s political 
leadership has made about what its desires in international politics are. It is generally, a country’s 
goals and ambitions in global politics whether economic, military, or cultural (Gvosdev, 2004; 
Byrd, 1996; Church, 1973). The interests are multifaceted: primary, secondary, or long-range. 
Primary interests are central to a nation’s immediate survival and security, a nation’s wealth, 
economic growth, preservation of national culture or heritage, and power. The external attitude 
(foreign policy and national roles) of a nation is therefore expected to be shaped by its national 
interest. 
The pursuit of national interest and the primacy of national power are considered to be in the 
calculations of nations from the foundation of the realist school of International Relations. From 
Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Carr, to Morgenthau and Waltz, political realism 
celebrates national interest and holds that foremost in national role conception are pursuits of 
national interest and power, negating the moralistic and legalistic fusion into foreign policy by 
the idealists with the view to creating a utopian and impossible institutional framework on global 
scale.  
It is debatable whether Nigeria has a set of clearly articulated national interests. For a nation that 
has played many leadership roles in Africa and global politics, a set of national interests should 
have been documented, from which reference could be made to actions of the government 
whether they are in the interest of the nation. What is relied on as Nigeria’s national interests are 
the outline of national leaders which change from time to time, and what the 1999 Constitution 
sets out as the foreign policy of the country (Folarin, 2010). Both the leaders’ and the 
constitutional outlines appear more like a set of roles to occupy than what the interests of the 
nation should be. The weak outlines or lack of documented set of well articulated national 
interests could have also been responsible for the ambiguous and weak line of role conception. 
For the bigger countries such as Germany and Britain, national interests are clearly articulated, 
classified in time and space, and justified. In the case of Nigeria, a set of five or six roles set out 
in the constitution would not suffice to be national interests, hence the conclusion that Nigeria 
requires clearer guidelines to its external roles and foreign policy by way of clearly defining its 
national interests through democratic processes (Pham, 2007). 
2. National Roles 
The concept of national role ascribes to the state an organic and social nature, which national 
interests may not do. According to Folarin (2010: 26), national role establishes the basis for the 
social functionality of states, and provides the platform for the comprehension of state behaviour. 
It allows foreign policy analysis to be more robust when talking about state behaviour or 
functionality of nations in the international system. National interests as discussed are a set of 
objectives. These may have been rationalized, articulated and outlined by policy makers. They 
may remain non-actualized until the state acts (or plays certain roles). The policy makers have 
more “roles” to play than articulating national objectives. They also may have to conceive roles 
for the nation.  Such roles may be conceived within the frameworks of national interest and 
objectives. Roles a state wishes to fill or which it has assumed in international politics often 
represent steps by which it hopes to realize or carry out its national objectives. Thus, national 
roles can be described as identified positions a state wishes to assume or play, and a set of tasks 
by which a state realizes its objectives or interest in international politics. It may not be enough 
for a state to articulate on paper its interests in world politics. It also needs to define its roles so 
as to effectively carry out its objectives. The interests are theoretical, the roles are practical. All 
states may have national interests, but not all states may conceive or play any external roles. 
However, all states require national roles if they want to fulfil their national aspiration (Krotz, 
2001: 5-7). National interest is therefore not the same thing as national roles. However, both 
complement each other and represent stages of national aspiration fulfilment on the international 
scene. The national role thus helps in a state’s foreign policy formulation and implementation.  
Thus, it becomes apparent that national interest defines the national roles to occupy. For 
instance, if it is the long-range interest of Nigeria to be a global power, it behoves of it to define 
roles to play to attain that objective or interest. It is America’s interest to give its best ally, Israel 
a safe haven in the Middle East and have considerable control of the oil-rich region. It has had to 
play active roles there, like dislodging or fighting real and imagined anti-Zion Islamic extremist 
leaderships, including Saddam Hussein, Al-Qaeda and Hamas, to attain its national interest. 
National interest is a potent force. National role is the moving force (Rosenau, 1980). 
Consequently therefore, such terms as national interest or national objectives do not explain state 
behaviour as much as roles states play. Only national roles clearly define state behaviour, just in 
the same manner that the role of a right-full back, a goal-keeper or striker explains the behaviour 
or attitude of players in a football match. The objective of a football team may be to win and 
qualify for the World Cup. But they have to play certain roles on the pitch first before they 
actualize that interest. Their interest to win cannot take them beyond their wish. Their roles 
accomplish their interest. So it is in the case of national roles. This understanding is generally 
lacking in the literature of Nigerian foreign policy so much that it has been difficult to identify 
and measure role conception in the formulation of Nigeria’s foreign policy and implementation 
of the Nigeria-Africa policy.   
 
3. National Role Conception 
Simply, national role conception is the identification or articulation of the external or national 
roles a state would fill in international politics. Flowing from Biddle and other social 
psychologists’ perspective, down to Holsti and the newly emerging role-influenced foreign 
policy analysts, national role conception has been described as a function of three basic 
influencing factors namely, perceptions of the political or ruling class, their interpretations of a 
nation’s external outlook, and the expectations of the domestic and international publics. States 
in contemporary international system set out tasks and assume particular roles they seek to 
undertake. Such tasks are conceived of and articulated in the foreign policy making process by 
the policy decision makers. As the state occupies or fills its formally conceived roles, this may 
ascribe to it a distinct image (Eulau, 1963) and make its behaviour predictable (Isaak, 1975). 
Therefore, national roles can be viewed as positions states attempt to occupy premised on 
general orientations governments adopt toward the outside world.  
Krotz gives a classic definition of national role conception of states. He conceptualizes it as  
The internal construction of collective self…what we want and what we 
do as a result of who we think we are, want to be, and should be; where 
the “we” represents nation and state as a social collectivity (Krotz, 2001: 
1).  
The first exponent of NRC, Holsti (1967: 29), captures it as “the domestically shared views and 
understandings regarding the proper role and purpose of one’s own state as a social collectivity 
in the international arena”. The views often represent the policy makers’ own definitions of the 
general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the 
functions their state should perform on a continuing basis in international politics. These policy 
makers are in different categories including formal and informal, governmental and 
nongovernmental bodies- working interdependently- whom Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann and 
Hermann (2001) have identified as “decision units” or groups. Such roles create certain 
obligations and commitment which policy makers will usually attempt to fill. Thus, national role 
conceptions may refer to the external orientations adopted by government, a set of formally 
identified tasks a state is likely to assume in international politics which may ascribe to it a 
distinct image.  
Therefore, role conception can be described as the act of identifying international or external 
roles to fill by a state. In addition, it may refer to the rationalization of strategies and steps to 
actualizing objectives of a nation in international politics done by foreign policy decision makers 
(Isaak, 1975; Kaplan, 1957). The process can be complex, secretive and very political (Rosati, 
2006). 
4. Foreign Policy 
Foreign policy is the rational pursuit of a set of national objectives.  The “pursuit” here suggests 
action, steps, roles, that will delineate the attitude or behaviour of a state in the external context. 
Foreign policy may be like a wedding ring with which the domestic context of a nation 
solemnizes its union with the international community. Such political “marriage” is underlined 
by the ambitions and desires of state; hence foreign policy is a means to an end for states 
(Goldstein, 2001). For Henderson (2005) foreign policy is a pattern of behaviour that one state 
adopts in relating with other states, an idea that Waltz (2005) considers as the strategy and tactics 
employed by the state in its relation with other states in the international system. Idang (1973) 
regards foreign policy as a plan or programme of actions of a state which determines the sum-
total of the state’s objectives in the international system. Holsti (1967) defines foreign policy as 
the actions of a state toward the external environment and the conditions-usually domestic- under 
which such actions are formulated. This seems to agree with Kissinger’s (1994) often quoted 
submission that in foreign policy analysis, the domestic structure is taken as given; foreign 
policy begins where domestic policy ends. Simply, foreign policy could mean external attitude of 
a state. The ultimate goal is to maximize greater advantage for the country. To this end, 
according to Nwolise (1999), the foreign policy of a developing country like Nigeria, should be 
geared towards national economic development so as to have a better leverage in international 
politics.  
5. Role Conception and Foreign Policy 
National role conception is considered as the moving force of foreign policy (Holsti, 1967, 1970, 
and 1987; Wish 1980; Krotz, 2001; Bilcik, 2004; Chafez, et al, 1996; Adigbuo, 2005 and 2007; 
and Folarin, 2010), For instance, Wish (1980: 532) considers role conceptions as “foreign policy 
makers’ perceptions of their nations’ positions in the international system.” They include 
perceptions of the general kinds of decisions, rules, commitments, and long-term functions 
associated with these international positions.” Wish holds that national role conceptions provide 
norms, standards and guidelines which affect many aspects of decision making. In agreement 
with Walker (1978), Wish posits that the variation in foreign policy conduct is a process of “role 
location”, an idea in tandem with Holsti’s earlier postulation (1967).  Holsti also uses the term 
perception to denote conception. This study disagrees in part with the usage. Perception may 
refer to a set of ideas or the thinking about role a nation can play. Conception is a stage higher 
than perception; it can be viewed as clearly identified roles, and strategies defined by a state with 
which to effectively play its roles in international politics. 
Holsti (1967 and 1987) offers two typologies of national role conceptions. In the first typology, 
nine role conception types are identified while the second has seventeen role types. Holsti 
attempts to prove that the international system is made up of states filling up roles to fulfil their 
national interest, and that national power, capacity, wealth, et cetera condition the roles 
conceived. The context of Holsti was however more suitable for the Cold War era and the 
accompanying ideological conflict and power politics of the time. It may therefore not be 
applicable wholesale to this study. However, there is no work on national role conception which 
can afford to deny the critical influence and contributions of Holsti to the clarity and usefulness 
of national role conception as a theoretical instrument to study foreign policy.   
Nevertheless, from the analyses of the forerunners of national role conception, it can be inferred 
that states define tasks and assume defined roles in the international system. Such tasks are 
conceived of and articulated in the foreign policy making process. The roles may ascribe a 
distinct image to the state and make its behaviour predictable. In this way, the role conception 
constitutes a nation’s attribute, shapes its attitude in international politics, makes its behaviour 
predictable, and provides a state with a stable sense of identity. 
Role conception is described by Rosenau (1990:220) as the “attitudinal and behavioural 
expectations that those who relate to an occupant of a role have of the occupant and the 
expectations that the occupant has of himself in given situations.” Hence, roles are synthesized 
phenomena, created by the combination of an actor’s subjective understanding of what its 
behaviour should be (role conception), international community’s demands (role expectations) 
and the particular context in which the role is being acted out (role performance). Put differently, 
national role conception is expected to manifest in role performance. Role performance finds 
expression in decisions, policies and actions (Holsti, 1970:234). 
Role conceptions are thus the categories of behaviour that states rely on to simplify and to help 
guide them through a complex world. The inference from the foregoing is that role conceptions 
are guiding principles which are then translated into policies. From the analyses of the scholars, 
it could be deduced that national role conceptions are prompted by any or a combination of the 
following: 
1. National interest- a set of rationally thought out and articulated objectives a state seeks to 
actualize in the international system. National interest also accommodates expectations of 
the domestic public. 
2. National capabilities- the calculated strengths a state has, which give it an edge over 
others and favourably position it in a bargaining situation. 
3. Attitudes and values- a set of national cultural traits, ethnic and religious values which 
shape a state’s foreign policy.  
4. Personality needs- the subjective perceptions of policy makers of what a national role 
should be based on, including domestic needs, critical international needs and personal 
desires of the leaders. 
5. Systemic prescriptions and expectations of other governments- the compelling forces 
from outside a domestic environment, including international law, critical events or 
trends in the external environment, including nuclear proliferation and conflicts. 
 
6. Strategic Interest 
Strategic interest defines strategic planning. Strategic interest refers to the desires and aspirations 
that are of direct importance to the security, military, social and economic advancement of a 
state. Such interest is driven by a national motivation to relate with an international community 
only or principally with the view of national gain. This thus requires strategic thinking, planning, 
and strategic or results-oriented role conceptions.  
Analytical Framework: National Role Theory (NRT) 
There are several theories relevant to foreign policy analysis. These include National Interest 
Theory, National Power Theory, Game Theory, Bargaining Theory, Decision Making Theory, 
and National Role Theory. The National Role Theory (NRT) is most apposite for obvious 
reasons: the topic of discourse naturally determines the suitability of the theory in use; it 
explicates the social functionality of states more than other theories; and it ascribes a distinct 
image to the state in the international community; while it enhances the predictability of state 
behaviour.  
NRT is derived from the concept of role as used first by psychologists and anthropologists in 
distinguishing individual and/or group role perceptions and actual performance in any social 
gathering be it family, peer group, religious group, workplace, community, market, et cetera. A 
number of social psychologists pioneered the role theory. These included Cooley, Linton (1936), 
Parsons (1937), Newcomb (1950), Sarbin (1966), Ackerman (1958), and Biddle (1979). 
Originally, the role theory is a perspective in social psychology that considers most of everyday 
activity to be living up to the roles, or expectations, of others. Role theory argues that in order to 
change behaviour it is necessary to change roles; roles correspond to behaviours and vice versa. 
In addition to heavily influencing behaviour, roles influence beliefs and attitudes; individuals 
will change their beliefs and attitudes to correspond with their roles. 
The successes of the role theory in psycho human analysis and in understanding of human and 
group behaviour/relations had probably been responsible for the adaptation by Holsti to explain 
state behaviour in the international system. In his piece “National Role Conceptions in the Study 
of Foreign Policy” (1970), Holsti adapts the role theory to nation’s behaviour positing that 
“national roles” are possible causal variables in the operation of the international system or in 
explaining the foreign policies of individual nations. According to Holsti most versions of 
balance of power theory posit three kinds of state in the system each of which is to make certain 
types of commitments (or enact roles) if the system is to remain stable. The three kinds of state 
are the aggressor state or group of states; the defender state or defending group of states; and the 
balancer. If the states do not play the roles imbalance, war and system transformation may result 
(Holsti, 1970:234). Holsti however observes that the balance of power theory does not make it 
explicit if it is the national attributes or roles that shape the system or it is the system attributes 
that rub on national roles. This is reminiscent of the level of analysis problem in foreign policy. 
Holsti also notes that national roles are peculiar to the circumstances and nature of the changing 
international system. For instance, the national roles in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s reflected the 
peculiarities of the Cold War. Put differently, they were roles or attributes that exhibited the 
feeling and intent of states in the polar world. The roles were variants of the Cold War system 
namely, bloc leaders, allies, satellites and non-aligned states. However, the role of the smaller 
states during this period was insignificant as theirs were subsumed in the larger roles of the in the 
two “big boys” clubs. By this Holsti points out the weakness of the old conception of national 
role. 
Consequently, Holsti (1970:235-236) advances some typologies of national role that are richer in 
details and more sensitive to distinctions in actual diplomatic behaviour. Holsti constructs these 
typologies around the perceptions of policymakers about what should be their national roles in 
international affairs. He raises a number of questions: are there multiple role perceptions same 
time? Does a government organize its policy to suit a single role? Does a state play several roles 
simultaneously, including incompatible ones? Is it all states that have role perceptions? What are 
the sources of role conceptions by policymakers?  
The arguments in respect of the application of role theory to the state suggest two lines of 
investigation. First it is seen to be a truism that nations have experiences which have persistent 
after-effects on their policies. For instance defeat of a nation in a war may produce a strong 
element of anti-militarism, as in the case of Japan, which will make that country to see itself as a 
natural leader in the vanguard of arms reduction or disarmament in international politics. Second 
there is an articulation among various roles within the state psychology and between roles and 
the conceptions states hold of themselves, their self-concept. With respect to the latter, research 
and theory on how the self influences role selection and in turn is fashioned by roles imposed by 
the exigencies of the situation and the requirements of the social structure, suggest some 
interesting parallels on the international level (Backman and Secord, 1968). 
It is pertinent to ask at this juncture: to what extent is the adoption of a role as an aggressor 
inhibited by a national self- conception as a peaceful state? Also how does a nation’s conception 
of itself change as a consequence of engaging in a role inconsistent with its national self-
conception?  It is against this backdrop that Nigeria’s external role conceptions would be 
critically examined.  
 
Nigeria’s Role Conception and Role Types since Independence 
Nigeria’s attitude in the African continent and the world from independence has suggested a 
number of role conceptions following Holsti’s typology. Using the prism of the first typology, 
which is the Mediator role type, it loosely describes Nigeria’s regional and global policies. The 
Mediator role stresses the interposition of bloc conflicts and policy of integration of the system. 
The sources of such role include location and traditional policy. Nigeria’s “traditional policy” 
has been the uncompromising placement of Africa at the centre of its foreign policy and one of 
its objectives is the strengthening of African ties through policies aimed at regional and 
continental integration. It has done this by its position in the 1960s to form an African 
organization, through a gradualist and cautious process in view of the diversities of the continent, 
which would unify the peoples and states and help them fight the common standing blocks to 
their nationhood; by the initiative to establish a functional regional body, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975; and the contribution to the formation of 
the African Union (AU) in 2001/2.  
Holsti’s second typology poses a serious problem of choosing the most appropriate role 
conception type for Nigeria. This is the Regional Leader role type. Nigeria tends to assume 
different roles at some points and in some ways that are explicable by the role types. It does not 
have a definite or specific role type. For instance, Nigeria perfectly assumes the role of Regional 
Leader, championing great causes, offering cutting edge initiatives for West African progress. As 
a Regional Protector, it has been a key player in the security, well-being and progress of other 
regions in Africa, including Central Africa (DR Congo, Rwanda), East Africa (Uganda, Eritrea, 
Somalia and Sudan), and Southern Africa (Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique, 
Botswana, and Zimbabwe). Its numerous peace and security initiatives, conflict resolution, 
dispute settlement landmarks and initiatives for economic and political integration in West 
Africa in particular and Africa in general, confer on it the position of a Mediator-Integrator. The 
New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM), and economic initiatives towards African development, impose on Nigeria the burden 
of Developer. 
However, these four role conception types (Mediator, Regional Leader/Protector, Mediator- 
Integrator, and Developer) seem to have a central thread running through them. Hence, it will not 
be out of place to make an adaptation of Holsti’s taxonomy in such a way that the Regional 
Leader, Regional Protector and Developer role types are subsumed in Regional Protector role 
conception type because of the outreach of the roles which include other regions. The other role 
conception that best fits Nigeria’s role conception type from 1960 is the Mediator-Integrator role 
conception type. 
As a result of the reciprocal character of the role relations, one partner may present itself to 
another in a fashion that requires the latter to adopt a role advantageous to the former. Assuming 
the role of a Regional Protector, Nigeria in West Africa and the African continent casts other 
nations in the region into such roles as protectee or faithful allies because they see Nigeria as a 
more powerful ally. Such a role type carries with it obligations on the part of nations in counter-
positions, which should be advantageous to the “defender,” Nigeria. In other words, because they 
regard it as their “benefactor”, Nigeria is supposed to take advantage of this survivalist 
disposition of these dependant-nations/allies to attract loyalty from all of them, while it creates 
division among them for the establishment of its own economic and political hegemony in such 
regions. Where such is conceived and underlies foreign policy implementation, the role 
conceptions are deemed to be strategic. But has that been the case with Nigeria? 
Nigeria’s role conceptions towards Africa and the world have expressed themselves in rapid 
response to peacekeeping, conflict resolution, and crisis management; drive towards economic 
integration, financial, technical and military assistance to needy African states, restoration of 
democracy, and promotion of good governance in the continent. The motivating spirit behind 
these acts of magnanimity and international morality has been the vision of national leaders that 
it is Nigeria’s ‘manifest destiny’ to assume leadership in Africa. This was more pointedly 
stressed by Olusegun Obasanjo: 
We imported and distributed for Africa. We sacrificed, fought and died 
for Africa. We have done so and we will not stop doing any of these. 
When the great nations of the world are vowing not to send their 
nationals to fight for any cause abroad, we have fresh in our mind, our 
1000 troops who, in the last decade, have died trying to restore peace in 
Our West African sub-region alone. All over Africa, there are tombs of 
Nigerian soldiers who went to sacrifice their lives for peace. Our troops 
are still out there. History will surely record for ever Nigeria’s inimitable 
African Nationalism…and there is no stopping us. Wherever there is a 
real need for us, we will be there (Obasanjo, 2000).  
Indeed, from inception of his second coming in 1999, Obasanjo had himself showed an 
appearance of a statesman whose orientation was not different from that of the founding 
fathers and other leaders before him, that Nigeria must employ all its endowments and 
resources for the sake of entire Africa and any troubled nations of the world. His words:       
Needless to say that, for us, development and progress is not an idle 
debate. For us, it is a matter of life and death! We certainly cannot afford 
the intellectual luxury of writing off our continent. Nor can we even 
begin to weigh the possible validity of the rather racist connotation that 
underdevelopment is innate to the character of Africans. Almighty God 
has also used our country (Nigeria) and her leaders to assist African 
states, especially those facing political and economic turmoil and those 
engulfed in leadership crises. We thank God that we have, as a people 
and nation, been able to make some positive impact in the areas where 
we have intervened. (Obasanjo, 2000: 3). 
The speech by President Olusegun Obasanjo at the Sixth Montreal Conference in 2000 captures 
the essence of this discussion. Nigeria’s diplomacy in Africa has always been hinged on the 
belief, exemplified in the actions of its successive leaders, particularly General Obasanjo that the 
country, with its vast human and natural endowments has a natural role to play in the 
development of the continent. What can be natural a role to play than for national leadership to 
enhance the living standard of its own people by many realist-driven roles in Africa and the 
world? This is where Nigeria may have differed from big powers such as the United States 
whose foreign policy is moved primarily by national economic interest for the overall happiness 
of its citizens and residents. Nigeria by its Mediator-Integrator roles has been playing certain 
exclusive roles in Africa: conflict management, restoring democratic governments, lending 
money to needy African states, and even supplying uninterrupted electricity to neighboring 
states. But at whose expense? This pious nature of pursuit of these Regional Protector or 
defender roles since 1960 has made Nigeria to assume a leadership role that gives it the image of 
a nation much more responsible abroad than at home. 
There are certain factors that place Nigeria in a position not only to assume a natural leadership 
role, but to have cause to maximize its leadership position more for the benefit of its citizens. 
Being the most populous black nation in the world implies that it has more mouths to feed and 
more tasks of national security to grapple with. As a multiethnic state with deep cultural 
diversity, it means that there are more daunting tasks and challenges to forge a greater, stronger 
and more united nationhood. As a nation made up of enterprising and intelligent populace, there 
would be more expectations from the world to see Nigeria contributing more to ground-breaking 
inventions and innovations, which would accord its people respect in global reckoning as it is the 
case in India and China. With its oil, the country would be expected more to be reinvented into 
another United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, or Qatar (fellow oil-rich nations) in terms of 
development of infrastructure for the good of the populace. Hence, all these rich qualities of 
Nigeria should go beyond being used for military swagger, wealth showmanship, and resource 
exhaustion in order to earn the sobriquet ‘the giant of Africa”.   
All the factors favouring it, the Nigerian leadership seemed to have erroneously perceived the 
nation as the “messiah” of the continent. The messiah or big brother mentality has conditioned 
Nigeria’s foreign policy to make Africa its centrepiece with the intentions to liberate, defend and 
integrate the continent. Unlike the way the US considered Mexico as its backyard and claimed 
the “manifest destiny” to possess it and become the sole hegemon in the Western Hemisphere in 
the 19th century; Nigeria rather sees Africa as a continent in need of its plenteous and accessible 
goodwill. 
Visibility or Strategic Roles? 
A number of justifications have been offered for Nigeria’s Afrocentric role conceptions and huge 
cost of regional protection. These justifications are embedded in the principles of Nigeria’s 
foreign and defence policy, namely: to guarantee Nigeria’s security, a secure neighbourhood 
must be its priority (King, 1996). Hence huge spending would rather imply investing in Nigeria’s 
betterment for the assurances of its own national security. Secondly, the largesse and goodwill to 
African neighbours have also been explained away as pertinent to maintain a good 
neighbourliness in order to enjoy the loyalty of the neighbouring states in the days of trouble like 
during the 1967-70 Civil War, when all the immediate neighbours stood behind Nigeria 
(Adeyemo, 2002).  
Thirdly and flowing from the first two analyses, is the argument that Nigeria’s rapid response is 
desirable so as to ward off the impending doom of refugee backlash and reconstruction, which at 
the end of the day, Nigeria would be expected to bear. Fourthly, Nigeria’s numerous 
interventions are also justified by the fact because Nigerians in large numbers live in virtually 
every African state it behoves it to protect them by averting crisis or stopping the conflicts their 
host countries.  
All of the above appear strategic and thus tend to place Nigeria’s foreign and defence policies in 
the class of strategic policy like that of the western nations. However, there are certain 
problematic questions that arise from them, which pale the significance. The multiple military 
interventions to keep the peace in Africa may be prompted by avoiding backlash; however, the 
dissipation of human and material resources, it is probably not conceived, becomes a liquidation 
factor in Nigeria’s human and material reserves for national security and economic stability in 
the future. Response to all other peacekeeping missions outside the region and continent are 
simply unjustifiable, geo-strategically. 
Also, Nigeria’s participation in almost all conflict resolution cases may be award-winning, but 
this may not translate to national development, political stability at home, as well as peace and 
security. There have been more cases of conflicts in Nigeria from independence to date than the 
conflicts it has assisted in resolving abroad, which compels inquisition about the local relevance 
of Nigeria’s conflict resolution ingenuity in the world. 
Moreover, the utility of the oil-power and wealth seems to have been of little or no relevance at 
home. Oil has been a resource-curse for Nigeria (because of the national poverty in the midst of 
plenty of it, wars and conflicts, and the growing spate of local terrorism), while it has been more 
of a blessing for other producing nations. While oil money facilitates foreign assistance to needy 
nations, funding of the highly capital-intensive Technical Aid Corps Scheme (TACS) to support 
poorer nations of the world since the Babangida days, and to roll out grants and loans to African 
nations, among other things; oil, which cannot even be refined in Nigeria, is resold to the country 
in its refined state at prohibitive cost. The country generates electricity for some nations in West 
Africa, including Benin, Burkina Faso and Ghana (Folarin, 2008). However, the nation has not 
been able to generate sufficient capacity to guarantee a regular supply of electricity for its own 
people for over forty years. Nigeria assisted in restoring democratic governments in Liberia, Sao 
Tome, and Sierra Leone (Okoroma, 2005), in some cases while under military rule; and in other 
cases while incredible elections and electoral fraud and violence overwhelm the home-front. 
Nigeria’s assumption of generous external roles at the expense of national strategic interest 
suggests the intention of Nigeria’s foreign policy to be the pursuit of visibility, recognition as the 
African giant and most credible spokesman in world affairs. The role conceptions and roles are 
not strategically calculated before assumption. While the good and secure neighbourhood 
principles and roles appear strategic, the fact that the domestic plane suffers a state of total 
insecurity and poor neighbourliness among the many ethnic groups that make it up renders it 
absolutely farcical.  
Lastly, the continued decline in Nigeria’s external profile and respect despite its many 
international roles (aside the problems of corruption and government irresponsibility) shows that 
strategy and tact are lacking in the foreign policy initiation, articulation, and execution. The 
decline began in the immediate neighbourhood where Nigeria has always sought to keep good 
friendship and security. For instance, before a volte face to appease it in 2003, Laurent Gbagbo 
of Ivory Coast had turned down Nigeria’s offer to send troops and military tanks and ships to 
Abidjan to help quell the political violence that had engulfed that nation at the time. Similarly, 
Equatorial Guinea rejected Nigeria’s warships sent to Malabo to stop a raging political crisis in 
the neighbouring country in 2005 (Oyo, 2005).  
More unfortunate for Nigeria is the fact many of the nations of Africa believe that Nigeria has 
too many internal problems to tackle than to spend so much on other nations’ problems. The 
Botswana envoy for instance argues that “a giant can no longer be measured by geographical or 
population size, or the amount of resources it has; but by how much it can use the little it has to 
solve many mundane problems for its population and join the league of states that can meet the 
basic needs of its people” (Lukes, 2009). Thus, Nigeria’s committal of resources to African 
affairs are viewed as a waste (Nuhu, 2009), and sometimes also perceived as means to actualize a 
grand, long conceived agenda to establish a Nigerian political and military hegemony in Africa, 
but with Nigeria not knowing yet, how to get this completed (Mvundura, 2009). 
Conclusion 
Nigeria’s role conceptions and roles in the world are multiple and high-staked. The challenge 
with these “very high” stakes is multifaceted: more regional burdens; high risks of being 
considered an incursionist in places where it may even believe it has positively intervened; 
placing national interest or economic diplomacy below African concerns; and earning for itself 
regional enemies. Moreover, the role conceptions are devoid of strategic dynamism to make 
Nigeria both internally and externally stable. The NRCs are most times unreflectively done, 
while they are sometimes the mere grandiose statements of uneducated soldiers in power or 
impressionistic politicians who delight in mere rhetorics. The scientific means to occupy the 
roles are often loosely stated, which do not often go beyond intervention in crisis situations, 
giving of financial and material donations, and restoration of stability as a “big brother” in Africa 
and the world. Economic and geo-military permutations and considerations to become and 
remain a world power/ hegemon are still not evident in Nigeria’s foreign policy attitude and role 
assumptions.  
Nigeria seems content in simply being recognized and commended for assisting other nations. It 
still lives in the past where it was a celebrated ‘Frontline State” in Southern African affairs. The 
political leadership must however see into the future and conceive roles which, while still 
placing Nigeria in leadership position, would rather be with the view to building in instruments 
such as economic diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, and military diplomacy that would create the 
desired leverage. The kind of cultural diplomacy of the US in which educational and cultural 
exchange programs offered by and sponsored by the country has over the years created a wide 
global group of scholars and persons of other nationals that have become more America-friendly 
and indeed Americanized, which also translates to trans-national cooperation and friendliness 
towards America and its trade and commerce. 
Lastly, the Nigerian government should bring more attention home, with the objective of 
reconstructing Nigeria and rehabilitating the infrastructures before it embarks on post-conflict 
reconstruction outside the country. The ennoblement of its citizens economically, and the 
creation of an enabling economy, with stable power supply, good roads, and internal security, 
would naturally attract enormous foreign investment that would grow the economy like that of 
South Africa and Ghana, which are fast overshadowing Nigeria as African giants.    
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